On 26 June, the US sanctioned Jean Malic Kalima, a prominent Rwandan businessman, accusing him of collaborating with the Rwandan government and the March 23 rebel group (M23) to smuggle gold from neighbouring DRC.
- The US claims that Gasabo Gold Refinery, which is led by Kalima, processed at least 60 kilograms of gold sourced from M23-controlled areas in South Kivu province (DRC) in early January.
- The Rwandan government is unlikely to withdraw its troops from eastern DRC or end its support for the M23 in the coming months, as it relies on the backing of other Western partners to prevent widespread international sanctions.
- Nonetheless, the growing international scrutiny of Rwanda’s mining sector, coupled with the DRC’s recent legal action against Rwanda, will expose mining operators in Rwanda to serious reputational risks.
- Whether this dampens investor sentiment enough to warrant pushes for governance reforms by multilateral institutions will depend on the extent to which the US remains engaged in the peace process.
- Although the security situation in eastern DRC will remain volatile in the next few months, the M23 may be forced to abruptly withdraw from captured areas in the coming year, as Rwanda struggles to appease the US
Accusations against Rwanda
According to the US, Gasabo Gold Refinery, together with three other mining companies controlled by Kalima (Bugambira Mines, Wolfram Mining and Processing, and Rwinkwavu Mining Corporation), form part of an illicit network that enables the integration of conflict minerals into global supply chains. The three firms were also sanctioned, along with Bosco Kayobotsi, the General Manager of Gasabo Gold. The US said that the network operates on behalf of the Rwandan government and the M23. UN experts and international human rights groups have long expressed similar concerns. Most recently, the UN group of experts on 11 June reported that newly created mining companies in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, acquired large quantities of coltan from the Rubaya mine, which is controlled by the M23. The group of experts also noted a 58% increase in Rwanda’s cassiterite exports since 2025, which does not align with the country’s production levels.
Separately, the Congolese government on 29 June initiated proceedings against Rwanda at the International Court of Justice. The complaint alleges that human rights abuses committed by Rwanda in the DRC since 1996 (the start of the first Congo war) may constitute a genocide against various ethnic groups in its eastern provinces, including the Hutu, Nyindu, Bashi, Lega, Bembe, Nande, and Hunde.
Tensions between Rwanda and DRC have remained elevated since February 2025, when the M23, with the backing of Rwanda, captured parts of North and South Kivu. The US sought to mediate between the two parties and brokered a peace deal in December 2025. However, the fighting has persisted.
Diplomatic shifts
The latest sanctions, and especially the decision of the US to directly implicate Rwanda in the alleged smuggling of Congolese gold, represent another significant diplomatic setback for Rwanda. For years, Rwanda had been able to downplay its role in the protracted security crises in eastern DRC by relying on the support of Western partners, especially on the back of its participation in regional peacekeeping initiatives. Although most Western partners still see Rwanda as an important partner, the recent rapprochement between the US and the DRC threatens to disrupt these dynamics.
In particular, the US, which is keen to erode China’s dominance in the DRC’s mining sector, has hardened its stance towards Rwanda, as underlined by recent sanctions on the RDF. Through extensive lobbying and the backing of France, Rwanda has been able to prevent other Western partners from imposing similarly strict sanctions, at least temporarily. Despite this, the increased international scrutiny of its dealings with the M23, when coupled with the DRC’s growing efforts to pursue formal action against alleged human rights abuses and mineral smuggling, risks putting Rwanda in an increasingly precarious situation.
In the short term, the country’s strong PR machinery may help manage investor sentiments even in the face of sanctions. However, President Paul Kagame has adopted a hardline stance towards the withdrawal of RDF troops from eastern DRC, using legitimate concerns over the presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an ex-Hutu genocidaire group, to justify his collaboration with the M23. Symbolic concessions, such as slight reductions in RDF troops, may temporarily appease the US.
However, US officials are increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of the peace process, and will be increasingly keen to take decisive action against Rwanda in the coming year. This means that US sanctions against more strategic entities, such as the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board (RMB) and the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)’s main holding company, Crystal Ventures, are increasingly likely in the coming year. These would cripple the RPF patronage system, especially because they would also prompt more sanctions from the EU. More importantly, sustained sanctions could eventually hamper investor sentiments, forcing multilateral financial institutions to increasingly push for governance reforms in Rwanda’s mining sector.
Mixed outlook
Meanwhile, the ICJ complaint could also open up the RPF’s legacy to criticism domestically. The ruling party has worked tirelessly to suppress any long-running accusations by sections of the Hutu that RPF troops committed mass atrocities against the Hutu refugees in eastern DRC following the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Regardless of the outcome of the case, the proceedings and the resulting scrutiny of the RDF’s conduct post-1994 could embolden dissidents in Rwanda to reopen contentious debates regarding a double genocide conspiracy theory. Given the closed political space, such acts are unlikely to threaten the RPF’s hold on power. However, because of the sensitivities regarding the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, latent ethnic divides, and Kagame’s strong aversion to criticism, the government will seek to suppress the case.
All in all, these pressures are unlikely to have a significant impact on the conflict in eastern DRC in the coming months. However, as it will become increasingly difficult for Kagame to manage the fallout from the US, the prospects of an abrupt withdrawal of the M23 from key towns in North and South Kivu will increase in the coming year. In the meantime, the security situation in the two provinces will remain volatile, exposing business and humanitarian operators to serious security threats. Likewise, operators in Rwanda’s mining sector will face mounting integrity risks.
Sources
“Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade”, US Department of the Treasury
“The Democratic Republic of the Congo institutes proceedings against Rwanda”, International Court of Justice
For tailored analysis on the Rwandan mining sector, please contact Africa Investigates Incorporated.
Email: africainvestigates2020@gmail.com
Tel: +221785282247
Dear Reader,
Thank you for following us this past year. We’re taking a brief publishing break and will return shortly.
Stay connected with us on LinkedIn and our website for updates.
See you soon,
The Management
Africa Investigates Incorporated
