On 22 January, Rwandan Ambassador to the US Mathilde Mukantabana told US lawmakers that Rwanda engages in “security coordination” with the March 23 rebel group, which has occupied large territories in neighbouring Eastern DRC since January 2025.
- For decades, Rwanda has denied any collaboration with the M23 despite multiple reports by the UN and independent researchers asserting the contrary.
- This admission is intended to pave the way for Rwanda to officially push for the creation of a buffer zone, in line with the M23’s desire to legitimise its control over parts of North and South Kivu provinces in DRC.
- Rwanda is banking on the increasingly transactional nature of US-Africa relations to escape major sanctions, but this could backfire, given the DRC’s growing importance to the US’s critical mineral ambitions.
- Improved relations between Qatar, another key mediator, and the growing factionalism in the M23 could further weaken Rwanda’s position in the coming months.
- In our view, these dynamics increase the likelihood of a direct armed conflict between the Congolese and the Rwandan armies, especially if the US disengages from the peace process in the coming months.
US House of Representatives
In a letter addressed to the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Mukantabana said that Rwanda’s engagement with the M23 is defensive in nature. She claimed that it is intended to protect Congolese ethnic Tutsis from persecution and prevent another genocide that could threaten Rwanda’s existence. Mukantabana added that Rwanda has chosen to disclose its collaboration with the M23 to foster trust and transparency.
The statement was issued amid a session held by the US House of Representatives to discuss the implementation of the Washington Accords – a peace deal between Rwanda and DRC on 4 December 2025. The deal was brokered by the US. During the session, several US lawmakers denounced continued fighting between the FARDC and the M23, with some urging Rwanda to withdraw its troops from DRC and end its support for the M23. In the letter, Mukantabana said that Rwanda would gradually draw back on its engagements with the M23 in proportion with the progress towards disarming the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – an ex-Hutu genocidaire movement based in eastern DRC. She accused the DRC army (FARDC) of backing the FDLR.
Separately, the M23 withdrew from the strategic town of Uvira (South Kivu, DRC), which it captured on 10 December 2025, on 17 January. According to Mukantabana, the Rwandan government encouraged this withdrawal.
Armed confrontations between the M23, the FARDC, and their respective allies have persisted. Most recently, the two camps fought between Baljnda and Banakindi Localities (Walikale Territory, North Kivu) on 23 January.
High Stakes for Rwanda
Mukantabana’s statement demonstrates a significant shift in Rwanda’s strategy for navigating the M23 crisis. This change is most likely driven by a genuine recognition that although Rwanda is still seen by the West as a strategic partner, DRC’s bargaining power has increased under President Felix Tshisekedi, whose government has consistently prioritised engagements with the US. More importantly, US policy towards Africa has become increasingly transactional under Trump, who is keen to reduce China’s dominance in the DRC mining sector and, more broadly, use his role in resolving the conflict to prop up his global image.
In this context, Rwanda can no longer afford to exploit the International Community’s sympathy over the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi to downplay its role in the M23 conflict. First, accusations of violating the Washington Accords carry more weight, and unlike previous administrations, the Trump administration would be open to imposing economic sanctions on Rwanda to advance Trump’s political and economic agenda. The M23’s capture of Uvira, which came only a few days after the signing of the Washington Accords, exposed the Trump administration to public ridicule, especially in the US. The withdrawal of the M23 from Uvira and Rwanda’s official declaration that it had a hand in it suggest that the US threatened Rwanda with serious sanctions in response to the incident.
Despite its fear of major economic sanctions and isolation from its Western partners, Rwanda remains unwilling to relinquish its political and economic interests in Eastern DRC. It is unlikely to withdraw its troops from North and South Kivu, leading to further armed confrontations with the FARDC. Rather than wait for the US threats to materialise, Rwanda is hoping to use Trump’s transactional attitude to explicitly push for the creation of a semi-autonomous “buffer” zone in Eastern DRC in exchange for its support for the implementation of the Washington Accords. The M23 is hoping to achieve the same goal through the Qatar-led mediation.
Precarious situation
However, this plan could seriously backfire. First, Tshisekedi will be reluctant to agree to a “buffer” zone, as this would legitimise long-running fears of annexation among Congolese communities, further damaging the president’s popularity. Boosting his popularity will be a priority for Tshisekedi, who is hoping to extend his hold on power beyond 2028, when his mandate expires. Tshisekedi will also intensify his diplomatic campaign against Rwanda. He will be especially keen to sensationalise reports of human rights abuse in M23-controlled areas in hopes that, in the aftermath of Mukantabana’s statement, these will increase the likelihood of stricter sanctions against Rwanda. Tshisekedi will also step up economic engagements with Qatar, offering economic concessions in the infrastructure sector to boost the DRC’s bargaining power in the Doha talks.
Meanwhile, Tshisekedi will heighten political pressures on the M23’s political allies, especially those linked to the Congo River Alliance (AFC). Tshisekedi will attempt to use asset seizures and criminal charges to push this faction into separate negotiations. This risks further undermining cohesion in the M23, reducing Rwanda’s control over the group.
Ultimately, both the DRC and Rwanda are focused on bolstering their bargaining power rather than implementing the Washington Accords in good faith. This underlines a growing openness on both sides to engage in direct conflict. The likelihood of this scenario materialising would increase if the Trump administration disengages from the mediation. In the meantime, we expect the scale and intensity of the clashes between the M23 and the FARDC to increase. The already volatile security situation in North and South Kivu will further worsen, exposing operators to serious logistical and security challenges. Firms will also be increasingly exposed to the M23’s extortive tactics. Moreover, fighting along the DRC-Rwanda border is increasingly likely in the next 1-3 months, especially if the US does not impose additional sanctions on Rwanda.
Sources
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mathilde Mukantabana, Rwanda in USA
DRC-Walikale: clashes between AFC/M23 rebels and FARDC in Buma, Actualite.CD
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